Motivated by assertions that the purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was to improve the credibility of financial reporting, this paper examines changes in the ways investors respond to accounting restatements before and after the implementation of the Act. We examine reporting credibility in the context of earnings restatements because restatements have significant implications for damaging investor trust and raising doubts about reporting credibility. We analyze three measures associated with investors' reputational concerns following earnings restatements: 1) the information content of post-restatement earnings announcements, 2) the contagion effects on market returns for industry-peer firms not announcing restatements, and 3) the investment activity of institutional investors. This study incorporates a pre/post SOX research design to test whether these characteristics are different following the implementation of SOX. We find that firms that announce earnings restatements after the implementation of SOX do not exhibit a significant decline in the information content of earnings, do not invoke significant contagion effects for industry-peer firms, and have more stable institutional ownership levels relative to restatements announced prior to SOX. Collectively the results support the idea that the reforms imposed by SOX have had a significant impact on increasing investors' assessments of reporting credibility for firms admitting to accounting errors.
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I. Introduction
This paper examines whether the credibility of financial reporting has improved for firms announcing earnings restatements following the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed on July 30, 2002 following numerous wellpublicized accounting scandals and restatements that peaked in the years leading up to law's ratification, and was lauded as "the bill that will help restore investor confidence and integrity in America's capital markets."
1 Regulators have claimed that SOX "contains some of the most farreaching changes that Congress has ever introduced to the business world" (Melancon 2002) , and academic research has demonstrated that some improvements in reporting quality have occurred since the implementation of the Act (e.g., Lobo and Zhou 2006 , Cohen, Dey and Lys 2008 , Bartov and Cohen 2009 ). However, little is known about whether SOX has had an impact on investors' assessments of financial reporting credibility, which was a primary goal of the regulatory Act.
We investigate whether SOX has had an impact on reporting credibility by examining whether investors react differently to earnings restatements announced after the Act's implementation. This setting allows us to evaluate whether investors' assessments of credibility have changed for a sample of firms that have viable suspicion about the integrity of reported information. Earnings restatements are significant economic events that damage a firm's reputation for integrity and reliable reporting (Karpoff, Lee and Martin 2008) , and evidence from studies of restatements announced prior to SOX documents that investors are wary of accounting information following restatement announcements (Wilson 2008, Kravet and Shevlin 2010) .
However, if the reforms imposed by SOX and the affiliated awareness towards reliable reporting have resulted in improvements in investors' assessments of reporting credibility, we should observe diminished reputational consequences from earnings restatements in the post-SOX era.
The comprehensive set of regulations imposed under SOX was designed to improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures (Hamilton and Trautman 2002) . Various outcomes of SOX, from improved detection of accounting mistakes (Feng and Li 2010) , better audit quality (DeFond and Lennox 2011) , and the imposition of greater deterrents of intentional earnings manipulation (Perino 2002) , should collectively have an effect on investors' opinions of the reliability of financial reports. We hypothesize that in the context of earnings restatements, the reforms imposed by SOX should cause investors to have less skepticism that the issues that led to the restatement will have an ongoing impact on the quality of the firm's reported financial information. The lack of significant investor skepticism should lead to improvements in assessments of reporting credibility (Shin 1994) .
A decrease in the number of reported accounting restatements would provide a foundation for investors to place greater trust in the financial information disseminated by U.S.
firms. Therefore, it is noteworthy that the volume of restatement announcements has risen significantly over time, with an increase in the number of announcements made each year since SOX was enacted. Regulators have expressed concern over the increase in restatement activity, as evidenced by the study commissioned by the U.S. Treasury Department to investigate the rise in number of restatement announcements (Scholz 2008) . In addition, former U.S. Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson expressed concern in 2007 that "restatements have the potential to erode public confidence in financial reporting." 2 Evidence from surveys of investor sentiment also indicates that securities holders continue to have concerns about financial reporting, with 71 5 percent of investors stating that accounting issues continue to have a negative effect on the market in the post-SOX era.
3 Furthermore, evidence from recent research shows that firms recognize these reputation concerns and take action to correct their image following earnings restatements. Ettredge, Huang and Zhang (2011) find that firms issue more frequent and more transparent earnings guidance after restatements to signal their intent to provide more credible information in the future. Chakravarthy, deHaan, and Rajgopal (2011) show that firms initiate specific repair actions, such as engaging in share repurchases and announcing changes in internal control mechanisms, in order to restore their credibility with investors. Considering the concerns expressed by regulatory officials, along with evidence that firms engage in actions to restore their reputations following restatements, it is not clear that the regulatory changes imposed by SOX have been successful in mitigating credibility concerns for firms announcing earnings restatements.
This study evaluates three ways in which the effects of SOX could impact investors' perceptions of reporting credibility following earnings restatements: 1) the information content of post-restatement earnings announcements, 2) the contagion effects on market returns for industry-peer firms not announcing restatements, and 3) the investment activity of institutional investors. Our choice of these three measures is based on research evidence that shows that these characteristics are associated with investors' concerns about reporting credibility following earnings restatements (Wilson 2008 , Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson 2008 , Burns, Kedia and Lipson 2010 . The study incorporates a pre/post SOX research design to test whether these characteristics are different following the implementation of SOX. If the reforms imposed under the Act were successful in improving investors' assessments of reporting credibility, we 6 hypothesize that earnings restatements should show lower declines in the information content of earnings, decreased contagion effects for industry-peer firms, and more stable institutional ownership after the implementation of SOX.
The results are consistent with improvements in financial reporting credibility for firms announcing restatements following the implementation of SOX. First, results from our analysis of the information content of earnings show that while investors exhibit a diminished view of reporting credibility for restatement firms prior to SOX, the decline is relatively inconsequential after SOX. This suggests that investors are not wary of the credibility of post-restatement earnings announcements in the post-SOX information environment. Second, we find that the price response to peer-firm restatement announcements is not significant in the post-SOX era, which implies that the negative connotations associated with restatements among firms within the same industry are dampened after the implementation of SOX. Third, we find that while institutional investors decrease their ownership interests around restatements announced prior to SOX, this effect is not observed for restatements announced in the post-SOX period.
Collectively, the evidence is consistent with a lack of overriding concern with respect to ongoing reporting quality for firms announcing restatements after the implementation of SOX.
Recognizing that changes in the underlying causes for restatements over time could provide an alternative explanation for our results, we separately examine whether the differences in investors' reactions to restatements before and after SOX are robust across various measures of restatement severity. In particular, we build on prior research that shows that the severity of the issues causing restatements has declined over time (Scholz 2008 , Myers, Scholz and Sharp 2010 , Burks 2011 ) and test whether the information content of earnings and contagion effects are similar for restatements related to fraud, restatements with a more negative effect on net income, 7 and restatements with high disclosure transparency. The results are robust across the pre-and post-SOX time periods regardless of restatement severity. This result provides further confirmation that despite the decrease in number of more impactful restatements in recent years, credibility concerns do not appear to be significant following the implementation of SOX.
Our paper makes several contributions to the restatement literature as well as to the line of research on changes in financial reporting behavior after SOX. In the post-SOX era of increased accountability and heightened reporting scrutiny, regulators and academics have speculated that accounting restatements still cause significant concern for investors. The results from this study are not consistent with this proposition, but rather indicate that the reforms provided by SOX have resulted in an environment of more credible financial reporting for firms admitting to errors in previously reported financial statements. Our evidence shows that for firms announcing restatements, SOX has been helpful in improving investors' assessments of reporting credibility. This outcome is likely to be of interest to regulatory officials and legislators, particularly those who highlighted SOX as an important legislative measure that would improve the credibility of financial reporting.
Our finding that credibility improvements have been a beneficial outcome of SOX is noteworthy given the mixed evidence from event studies of the anticipated net benefits and costs of SOX (Li, Pincus and Rego 2008, Zhang 2007) and from research regarding the postimplementation consequences of SOX (Ge and McVay 2005) . Our study also contributes to the line of research that examines characteristics of financial reporting in the post-SOX environment (Lobo and Zhou 2006 , Koh, Matsumoto and Rajgopal 2008 , Bartov and Cohen 2009 While the results in Burks's study are not consistent with investor confusion surrounding recent restatements, it is not evident ex-ante that this lack of confusion would necessarily imply a decreased concern regarding post-restatement reporting credibility. Evidence from our study suggests that improvements in the credibility of financial reporting are likely a significant influence on the increase in pricing efficiency with respect to restatements announced in the post-SOX reporting environment.
A major difficulty in evaluating the specific influence of SOX is that the regulation applied to the majority of publicly traded firms and had a substantial impact on multiple aspects of securities markets (Leuz and Wysocki 2009, Leuz 2007) . As a result, it is challenging to disentangle the effects of SOX from other contemporaneous events, such as changes in NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements, which occurred during the same time period (Leuz 2007).
Therefore, we are careful to interpret our results as providing evidence of an association between the implementation of SOX and its package of reforms with improvements in reporting credibility, rather than attributing specific provisions enacted under SOX as providing the only support for our inferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Motivation and hypothesis development is in Section II and the empirical methodology is described in Section III. Section IV provides a description of the sample and the results are presented in Section V. Conclusions and implications for accounting and public policy are provided in Section VI.
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II. Motivation and Hypothesis Development
At the time SOX was enacted, the Act was promoted as "the bill that will help restore investor confidence and integrity in America's capital markets." 4 Several well-noted features of the Act were designed to improve reporting quality, including increased governance requirements (e.g., enhanced role of independent audit committee members under Section 301), imposition of more significant penalties for managerial misconduct (Section 906), and more extensive requirements for executive attestation of accurate reporting (Section 302). From a legal perspective, Coates (2007) argues that the most influential provisions of SOX were its overhaul of the auditing process of U.S. public companies (e.g., establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board under Sections 101-109) and the implementation of incentives for firms to direct resources toward well-functioning internal control systems (Section 404). Given the wide range of changes imposed by SOX, it follows that the Act's package of provisions should have helped to promote investors' assessments of the credibility of financial reporting.
5
Empirical studies of changes in accounting characteristics after SOX provide mixed evidence as to whether the quality of accounting information as improved. Several studies report results that are consistent with improvements in reporting quality after SOX. Lobo and Zhou (2006) 5 While regulators and leading accounting practitioners have claimed that SOX "contains some of the most farreaching changes that Congress has ever introduced to the business world" (Melancon 2002) , critics have challenged whether the reforms are as impactful, from a legal perspective, as many have alleged (Ribstein 2002 , Cunningham 2003 . Similarly, accounting research has debated whether SOX imposed net benefits or net costs on firms (Zhang 2007 , Leuz 2007 . We acknowledge these debates, but reinforce that the primary goal of our paper is to examine whether reporting credibility has improved following the implementation of SOX, which should be of interest to both supporters and critics of SOX. We do not view this study as providing evidence on whether SOX has been beneficial in a broader sense, as that would require a complete analysis of all the benefits and costs of the regulatory changes.
10 relative to gains. Bartov and Cohen (2009) We propose three hypotheses to examine whether financial reporting credibility has changed for firms announcing restatements since the implementation of SOX. The first 13 hypothesis examines whether the decline in the information content of earnings following restatement announcements exists in the post-SOX era. Wilson (2008) finds a short-term decline in the price response to subsequent earnings announcements following restatements, which is consistent with a decline in the market's assessment of post-restatement reporting credibility.
Given that improving the integrity of financial reporting was a primary goal of SOX, it follows that the regulatory changes brought about by the Act would result in mitigating suspicions with respect to reporting credibility following restatements. Accordingly, the first hypothesis is:
The decrease in the information content of earnings following restatements is moderated in the post-SOX period.
The second hypothesis relates to whether restatements announced following the implementation of SOX continue to invoke reporting concerns for nonrestating industry-peer firms. Using a sample of firms that announced restatements prior to SOX, Gleason, Jenkins and
Johnson (2008) find that nonrestating peer firms within the same industry as companies announcing restatements experience statistically significant share price declines over the restatement announcement window.
14 remain a concern following restatements. Therefore, the second hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is: 
III. Empirical Methodology Information Content of Earnings
We use the following cross-sectional regression in the analysis of whether the information content of quarterly earnings announces changes following restatements:
This regression measures the earnings response coefficient (ERC) for quarterly earnings releases around each restatement announcement. UR_QTR it is the equally-weighted marketadjusted unexpected return over the three day period centered on the quarterly earnings announcement date. 10 QTR it is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i's earnings announcement belongs to quarter t and is equal to zero otherwise, and UE it is unexpected quarterly earnings for firm i at quarter t's announcement date. Quarters t = 0 and t = 1, respectively, represent the quarterly earnings release just prior to and just following firm i's restatement announcement. We include data for all additional earnings announcements available for each firm, from four quarters before time t = 0 (i.e., quarters t = -4, -3, -2, -1, the "base period") through six quarters after the restatement announcement (i.e., quarters t= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). Additional variables incorporated in the model include NONLINEAR it , to account for nonlinearlity in the priceearnings relation (Freeman and Tse 1989), as well as CONTROLS it , a series of variables designed to control for factors known to influence the relation between price and earnings (e.g., Kormendi
10 The value of UR_QTR is winsorized at the one percent level to control for the influence of outliers. We test different weighting schemes and empirical methods for calculating abnormal returns and find consistent results using traditional market-adjusted, mean-adjusted, and market model-adjusted unexpected returns (results not tabulated). 
Restatement-induced Contagion Effects
We follow the methodology of Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson (2008) Information transfer effects are evidenced by mean unexpected announcement period stock returns for nonrestating industry-peer firms that are significantly different from zero (i.e., UR_ANN it that is significantly different from zero). If concerns with respect to reporting quality are diminished following the implementation of SOX, we expect to observe smaller or insignificant contagion effects for industry-peer firms during the post-SOX period.
Institutional Investor Analysis
We examine changes in institutional ownership levels surrounding restatement announcements in order to investigate whether institutional investors have doubt about reporting credibility in the post-SOX period. We calculate the change in institutional ownership percentage:
where ADJOWN t = R_AVGOWN t -OTH_AVGOWN t , R_AVGOWN t =( / n), and
R_OWN (OTH_OWN) is the percentage of the restatement (non-restatement) firm owned by institutional investor i during quarter t, and / n ( / n) represent the average ownership percentage for all restatement (non-restatement) firms across n firms in quarter t.
Adjusted ownership levels (ADJOWN) are calculated as the difference between the restatement firm ownership average (R_AVGOWN) and the average ownership of firms not announcing restatements (OTH_AVGOWN) in order to account for macroeconomic trends in institutional ownership over time.
Evidence of a change in institutional ownership from one quarter to the next is represented by concern about reporting credibility in the post-SOX period, we expect the changes in ownership levels for the quarters immediately before and after the restatement announcement will not be significant for restatements announced after July 30, 2002.
IV. Sample
The sample consists of restatements announced by U. the maximum number of sample observations possible. The subsamples used for our analyses of the information content of earnings, contagion effects, and institutional ownership hypotheses consist of 1,036 ("information content subsample"), 1,321 ("contagion subsample"), and 2,273
("institutional investor subsample") unique restatement announcements, respectively. 12 The number of observations for each subsample is reported by the year of the restatement announcement in Figure 1 .
<<Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here>> Descriptive statistics for each of the subsamples are reported in Table 2 , with all values reported separately for restatements that were announced before and after SOX was implemented (panel A and B, respectively). All firm-level characteristics are measured as of the fiscal yearend prior to the restatement announcement. Looking across the subsamples, the firm-level characteristics are not markedly different in the pre-and post-SOX periods, with the exception that sample firms that announced restatements in the post-SOX period are relatively more profitable, have higher book value of assets, and show relatively lower growth rates compared to firms that announced restatements prior to SOX. Compared to the population of firms covered by Compustat, we find that our restatement sample firms are relatively smaller (larger) and less 12 The most significant data restriction for the information content subsample is availability of analyst forecasts from I/B/E/S. We report results in the paper using this subsample because of the long-standing belief in the accounting literature that analyst forecasts are a superior measure of the market's expectations of earnings (Brown, Hagerman, Griffin, and Zmijewski 1987) , which is used to calculate UE in the empirical analysis. However, we conduct a robustness check using an expanded sample of 1,509 restatements that have sufficient data to calculate UE based on a seasonal random-walk model of expected earnings (Bradshaw, Drake, Myers and Myers 2012) . Results from tests of equations (1) and (3) using this alternative sample are quantitatively unaltered from those reported in the paper.
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(more) profitable before (after) SOX, which is consistent with descriptive statistics reported by other restatement research (results not tabulated).
<<Insert Table 2 in restatement characteristics related to severity across time, we control for these effects in all of our stock price-based empirical analyses.
13 Consistent with the research design of Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson (2008) , the contagion subsample is restricted to restatements that result in a greater than -1.0 percent stock price decline in the short-window period around the announcement date. Therefore, the statistics regarding mean and median UR_ANN in both the pre-and post-SOX period are more negative for the contagion subsample relative to the other subsamples. The stock price condition placed on this subsample also provides most of the explanation for the data attrition reported in Table 1 .
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V. Empirical Results
Information Content of Earnings
The first hypothesis posits that firms announcing restatements in the post-SOX period will not experience the same loss in the information content of earnings as firms announcing restatements prior to SOX. Panels A and B of Table 3 report the ERC for quarterly earnings announcements surrounding restatements before and after the implementation of SOX. In each panel, coefficient values for relevant variables from equation (1) are reported in the left column, with summation of coefficients for calculation of the quarterly ERC pattern in the column on the right.
<<Insert Table 3 about here>> Results reported in panel A of Table 3 show that firms announcing restatements prior to suggests that investors harbor less concern with respect to reporting credibility for firms announcing restatements in the post-SOX era and is consistent with our predictions.
While the results reported in Table 3 are consistent with dampened credibility concerns for firms announcing restatements after SOX, an alternative explanation is that this effect could be due to the smaller economic implications of restatements announced in more recent years (Scholz 2008 , Burks 2011 . 14 Due to the differences in restatement characteristics for our sample between the pre and post SOX periods that were reported in Table 2 , we extend our analysis of the information content of earnings announcements by evaluating whether these effects are consistent across different restatement characteristics. We incorporate the following regression for this analysis:
14 Required attestation of internal controls by the auditor and management under Section 404 of SOX could also potentially influence the results reported in Table 3 . If firms that announced restatements in the post-SOX period had reported deficiencies in their internal control systems under Section 404 prior to or concurrent with the revelation of the restatement, the ERC for post-restatement earnings announcements might be lower due to investors' assessments of poor reporting credibility due to weak internal controls rather than the restatement event.
To investigate whether internal control weaknesses are potentially affecting our results, we divide the post-SOX restatement sample into three groups: firms that disclosed material internal controls weaknesses, firms that reported effective internal controls, and firms that did not issue a 404 report. The results from this analysis (not tabulated) show that the information content of earnings around the restatement event is similar to that for the main sample (as reported in Panel B of <Insert Table 4 about here>>   Table 4 displays the ERC for quarterly earnings announcements following restatement announcements for each severe and non-severe restatement category in the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods (panel A and B, respectively). Within each category, the more severe restatement characteristic of the pair (e.g., below-median magnitude) is reported in the left column with the less severe characteristic (e.g., above-median magnitude) reported in the right column. Looking first to the pre-SOX period (Table 4 , panel A), the information content of earnings is consistently lower for at least three quarters following the restatement announcement for all of the severe restatement categories. For example, the ERC for the three earnings announcements following restatements with below-median magnitude is significantly less than the ERC for the base period (ERC = 1.19 for quarter 1, ERC = 1.47 for quarter 2, and ERC = 1.43 for quarter 3, relative to the ERC = 2.17 for the base period ). In addition, the information content of earnings is lower following the restatement for two of the less severe restatement categories (restatements not involving fraud and restatements with above-median magnitude). The only exception to the longer duration decline in the information content of earnings is for restatements disclosed less transparently, where the ERC is significantly lower than the base period for earnings announced only one quarter following the restatement (ERC = 2.04 for quarter 1 relative to the ERC = 2.65 for the base period). Overall, the multiple-quarter decline in the information content of earnings is consistent with the general pattern observed prior to SOX (Table 3 , panel A) and indicates that concerns with respect to reporting credibility were widespread. There is a nearly uniform short-24 term loss in the information content of subsequently released earnings during the pre-SOX time period, and this effect does not appear to be confined to more severe restatements.
Panel B of Table 4 shows that the ERC patterns are substantially different in the post-SOX period across all categories. The information content of earnings for restatements related to fraud shows the most significant decline in the period following SOX, where the ERC is significantly lower for two quarters following these restatement announcements (ERC = 0.95 for quarter 1 and ERC = 1.39 for quarter 2 relative to the ERC = 3.16 for the base period). On the other hand, restatements with below median magnitude, restatements announced more transparently, and restatements not related to fraud exhibit marginally significant declines in the information content of earnings for just one quarter. These results are in line with the pattern observed for the entire sample of restatements announced following SOX (Table 3 , panel B).
Lastly, no significant declines are observed for restatements with above-median magnitude and those announced less transparently. Overall, the subsample results reported in Table 4 corroborate evidence presented in Table 3 , and lend support to the idea that investors experience minimal concerns with respect to reporting credibility following restatement announcements in the post-SOX period. The only significant reputational concerns affiliated with post-SOX restatement announcements seem confined to restatements related to fraudulent behavior, and the effects are more short-lived relative to the decline in the information content of earnings prior to SOX.
Restatement-induced Contagion Effects
The second hypothesis proposes that restatement-induced contagion effects are mitigated following the enactment of SOX. Descriptive statistics regarding the unexpected announcement period returns (UR_ANN) incurred by 43,754 industry-peer firms for 1,321 restatement 25 announcements are reported in panel A of Table 5 . 15 The average UR_ANN for the restatement firms across the entire period is -10.00 percent, with a significant difference in the magnitude of unexpected returns before and after SOX (UR_ANN = -15.30 percent and UR_ANN = -7.13 percent, respectively). As expected, the nonrestating peer firms exhibit significantly negative unexpected returns for restatements announced prior to SOX (UR_ANN = -0.27 percent), with a contagion effect similar in magnitude to that reported by Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson (2008) .
The contagion effect for nonrestating industry-peer firms is significantly different for restatements announced before and after SOX (t-statistic = 4.55), and it notable that the contagion effect for restatements announced after SOX is insignificantly different from zero (UR_ANN = -0.02 percent). This diminished unexpected return for nonrestating peer firms is consistent with an absence of information transfer effects after the implementation of SOX. We interpret these results as suggesting that restatements do not convey significant credibility concerns within industries in the post-SOX period.
To analyze whether the results reported in panel A are robust across different restatement characteristics, we separately report contagion effects for more and less severe restatements.
Panels B, C, and D report the unexpected announcement-period returns for peer firms of firms announcing restatements due to fraud, restatements with above-median magnitude, and restatements with more transparent disclosure, respectively. If these types of restatements are more severe they should invoke greater concerns with respect to reporting credibility following 15 Restatements were excluded from the base group of the contagion analysis if another restatement was announced within the same industry over the previous ten days. This eliminated 138 restatements. Excluding multiple industryrelated restatements announced during a short window of time mitigates concern that the rise in number of annual restatements during the sample period has resulted in diminished contagion effects that are simply due to a saturation effect (i.e., with many firms in an industry announcing restatements close in time, the price of nonrestating firms may react less due to the abundance of bad news regardless of whether investors have credibility concerns about the restatement firms). However, we replicated the contagion analyses with these 138 observations in the base restatement group and found that the contagion effects are significantly different for non-restating firms in the pre-and post-SOX periods.
the restatement announcements, and we expect to see greater contagion effects for nonrestating peer firms.
<<Insert Table 5 
Institutional Investor Ownership
The third hypothesis proposes that institutional investors' ownership levels are not impacted by restatement announcements made after the SOX reforms were implemented. If Results from the analysis of changes in institutional ownership by investor style are presented in Table 7 Table 7 demonstrate that the positive ownership changes observed for aggregate levels of institutional ownership (panel C of Table 6 ) appear to be driven by increases in ownership by quasi-indexers. In general, institutional ownership interests for all three types of investors are increasing over time in the post-SOX period.
VI. Conclusion
This study examines whether investors respond differently to accounting restatements following the implementation of SOX. The objective of the paper is to evaluate whether the regulatory changes imposed by the Act have had a significant effect on increasing the credibility of financial reporting for firms announcing restatements. Our study is motivated by regulators'
assertions that a goal of SOX was to improve the perceived reliability of information reported by U.S. firms, as well as concerns that have been expressed with respect to the rise the number of restatements announced since the implementation of SOX. We analyze three measures that extant research has shown to be affiliated with reputational concerns following restatements: 1) the information content of post-restatement earnings announcements, 2) the contagion effects for nonrestating industry-peer firms, and 3) the investment activity of institutional investors. If the emphasis on accounting reliability following the enactment of SOX resulted in increased financial reporting credibility, we hypothesize a decrease in negative reputational consequences following restatements 33 Results are consistent with decreased concerns with respect to reporting credibility following earnings restatements following the implementation of SOX. We find very little evidence of a decrease in the information content of earnings following restatements, which indicates that concerns with respect to reporting quality are not widespread following restatement announcements in the post-SOX era. We also find muted restatement contagion effects following SOX, which is consistent with a decrease in the previously documented information transfer effects that caused reporting credibility concerns for industry-related firms in the pre-SOX period. Finally, we do not find evidence that institutional investors decrease their ownership interests surrounding restatement announcements in the post-SOX period. The inferences are consistent after accounting for changes in the severity of causes underlying earnings restatements over across time.
Our study enhances the literature on earnings restatements, as the results indicate that reputational concerns are not significant following restatements announced in the years since SOX was implemented. This finding is in contrast with regulators' assertions that the large number of accounting restatements in recent years has continued to cause credibility issues for U.S. firms. Our paper also relates to the line of research examining improvements in financial reporting quality following the enactment of SOX. Evidence from this study provides support for an improvement in financial reporting along a dimension that has not yet been the focus of existing research -financial reporting credibility -which is noteworthy given regulators' claims that the primary goal of SOX was to increase the perceived reliability of financial reporting. Average level of institutional ownership in quarter t for firms announcing restatements SIZE* Log of total assets, measured as of the year-end prior to the restatement announcement TRANSP_DISC ¥ Indicator variable equal to 1 if the restatement was disclosed via press release, filing of form 8-K, or an amended filing, and zero otherwise UE Unexpected quarterly earnings for firm i at quarter t's announcement date, where expected earnings is based on the median of analyst forecasts outstanding within 60 days prior to the day before the earnings announcement, scaled by price as of the end of the quarter for which earnings are announced UR_ANN Unexpected return around the restatement announcement date, calculated as the difference between the firm's buy-and-hold return and the equallyweighted CRSP market index buy-and-hold return for the three days centered on the restatement announcement date UR_QTR Unexpected return around the quarterly earnings announcement, calculated as the difference between the firm's buy-and-hold return and the equallyweighted CRSP market index buy-and-hold return for the three days centered on the earnings announcement date * Indicates variable is included in CONTROLS it , a series of control variables used in equations (1) The base sample consists of 2,395 restatements announced between 1995 and 2006. After collecting relevant information from I/B/E/S and Compustat, the subsample for the information content analysis consists of 1,036 restatements. After removing restatements with abnormal announcement-period returns greater than -1.0%, the subsample for the contagion analysis consists of 1,321 restatement announcements. After merging data from Thompson/Reuters on institutional ownership, the subsample for the institutional investor analysis consists of 2,273 restatement announcements. Firm-level characteristics UR_QTR -0.06% 0.10% n/a n/a n/a n/a Firm-level characteristics UR_QTR -0.03% -0.05% n/a n/a n/a n/a (1) are reported in the left column with the sum of relevant coefficients for calculation of the ERC reported in the right column. The ERC for four quarters prior to the restatement announcement is the base period and the ERC for the six quarters after the restatement announcement is noted as quarter t= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. All variables in equation (1) are defined in the appendix. The symbols ***, ** and * denote significance of the ERC from the base period at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (one-tailed).
Individual Estimates
Sum of Estimates Restatement announcements that occur prior to or on (after) July 30, 2002 are included in the pre-SOX (post-SOX) time period. The ERC for four quarters prior to the restatement announcement is the base period and the ERC for each of the six quarters after the restatement announcement is noted as quarter t= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Restatements are classified as involving fraud if: (1) press releases or amended filings mention fraud or irregularities; (2) the SEC issued an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Action (AAER) against the company and/or management; or (3) criminal indictments against the company or its managers resulted from the restatement. Restatements are classified as having below-median (above-median) magnitude if the amount of restated net income, scaled by total assets, is below (above) the median for the information content subsample. Restatements are classified as having more transparent disclosure if they are disclosed via press release, filing of form 8-K, or an amended filing, and are classified as having less transparent disclosure otherwise. The symbols ***, ** and * denote significance of the ERC from the base period at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (one-tailed). UR_ANN is the unexpected return around the restatement announcement date, calculated as the difference between the buy-and-hold return on the equally-weighted CRSP market index and the firm's buy-and-hold return for the three days centered on the restatement announcement date. Restatements are classified as involving fraud if: (1) press releases or amended filings mention fraud or irregularities; (2) the SEC issued an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Action (AAER) against the company and/or management; or (3) criminal indictments against the company or its managers resulted from the restatement. Restatements are classified as having above-median (below-median) magnitude if the amount of restated net income, scaled by total assets, is above (below) the median for the contagion subsample. Restatements are classified as announced more transparently if they are made via press release, filing of form 8-K, or an amended filing. Restatement announcements that occur prior to or on (after) July 30, 2002 are included in the pre-SOX (post-SOX) time period. The symbols ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 6 Institutional ownership levels are reported for four quarters before and after the restatement announcement. Quarter zero is the quarter during which the restatement announcement is made and quarters = -4, -3, -2, -1 (quarters = 1, 2, 3, 4) indicate the four quarters leading up to (following) the restatement announcement. Restatement announcements that occur prior to or on (after) July 30, 2002 are included in the pre-SOX (post-SOX) time period. R_AVGOWN t is the percentage of the restatement firm owned by institutional investors at the end of quarter t . ADJOWN t is the adjusted level of institutional ownership and is equal to R_AVGOWN t less OTH_AVGOWN t , where OTH_AVGOWN t is the average percentage of institutional ownership across all firms. CHANGEOWN t is the change in adjusted ownership level and is calculated as the difference between ADJOWN t and ADJOWN t-1 . The percentage of negative change observations is equal to the number of restatement firms that had a decrease in institutional ownership from quarter t to quarter t-1 divided by the number of ownership observations abailable for quarter t . The symbols ***, ** and * denote significance from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Institutional ownership levels are reported for four quarters before and after the restatement announcement. Classification of investor type j as transient, quasi-indexer, or dedicated follows Bushee (1998) . Quarter zero is the quarter during which the restatement announcement is made and quarters = -4, -3, -2, -1 (quarters = 1, 2, 3, 4) indicate the four quarters leading up to (following) the restatement announcement. Restatement announcements that occur prior to or on (after) July 30, 2002 are included in the pre-SOX (post-SOX) time period. R_AVGOWN jt is the percentage of the restatement firm owned by investor type j at the end of quarter t . ADJOWN jt is the adjusted level of institutional ownership and is equal to R_AVGOWN jt less OTH_AVGOWN jt , where OTH_AVGOWN jt is the average percentage of institutional ownership for type j across all firms. CHANGEOWN jt is the change in adjusted ownership level and is calculated as the difference between ADJOWN jt and ADJOWN jt-1 . The symbols ***, ** and * denote significance from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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